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Session 12

Investor-State Arbitration – PCA Perspective

Submitted by: Permanent Court of Arbitration



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The Permanent Court of Arbitration

and the investor-State dispute settlement system

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Overview

Part I. Introduction to the PCA

Part II. Diversity

Part III. Flexibility

Part IV. Convergence

Part I

Introduction to the PCA

- I. History
- 2. Evolution of Mixed Arbitration
- 3. PCA Today


I. History of the PCA

1899 Hague Peace Conference: "seeking the most objective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace..."

Result: 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes







Art. 16: "arbitration is ... the most effective, and most equitable, means of settling disputes..."

Art. 20: establishes <u>Permanent Court of Arbitration</u> to be "accessible at all times" for "immediate recourse ... for international differences, which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy"

2. Evolution of Mixed Arbitration

170 known arbitrations between 1794 (Jay Treaty) and 1899 (Hague Conference)

Most common issue for arbitration:

Subject Matter	# of Arbitrations
Private Claims (e.g. contracts)	25
Boundary/Sovereignty Disputes	23
Damage from Armed Conflict/Civil War	18
Damage or Detention of Ships	9
Prize Disputes	7
Arbitrary Arrest/Denial of Justice	7
Fisheries Disputes	4
Railroad Concessions	3

2. Evolution of Mixed Arbitration

Disputes between States & Private Parties – Methods of protecting private parties abroad:

Period	General Approach Private Warfare	
Early Middle Ages		
Late Middle Ages – 17th Century	Private Reprisals	
18th Century – 19th Century	Public Reprisals	
19th Century – 20th Century	Diplomatic Protection and State-State arbitration or adjudication	
Late 20th Century	Direct Arbitration between States and Privat Parties	

2. Evolution of Mixed Arbitration

Preferential Treatment of the Blockading Powers of Venezuela (Germany, UK and Italy v.

Venezuela, 1903)





2. Evolution of Mixed Arbitration

Radio Corporation of America v. China (1935)










2. Evolution of Mixed Arbitration

- PCA Rules for Mixed Arbitration (1960)
- · ICSID (1965)
- UNCITRAL Rules (1976)
- BITs (late 1980s onwards)







Part II

Diversity

- I. Choice of forum
- 2. Independence and impartiality
- 3. Forum shopping
- 4. Investor wrongdoing/windfall

I. Choice of forum

- I. Number of BITs
- 2. Choice of forum in BITs
- 3. Non-ICSID States:

- Bolivia

- Poland

- Brazil

Russia

- Ecuador

South Africa

- India

- Thailand

- Iran

- **V**enezuela

- Mexico

Viet Nam

2. Independence and impartiality

Three cases in Nov-Dec 2009:

- I. Participaciones Inversiones Portuarias v. Gabon: ICSID rejects challenge, distinguishing high ICSID standard ("manifest lack") from IBA Guidelines ("justifiable doubts")
- **2. Perenco v. Ecuador:** PCA sustains challenge in sui generis procedure based on IBA Guidelines ("justifiable doubts")
- ICS v.Argentina: AA designated by PCA sustains challenge under UNCITRAL Rules ("justifiable doubts"), relying on IBA Guidelines

3. Forum shopping

ICSID Convention, Art. 25: "The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute <u>arising directly out of an investment</u>, between a Contracting State [...] and a <u>national of another</u> Contracting State"

White Industries v. India (UNCITRAL): Tribunal finds no need to comply with inherent definition of "investment" (Salini test: (1) contribution, (2) duration, (3) risk, and (4) return)

García & García v. Venezuela (UNCITRAL): Tribunal upholds jurisdiction over dual Spanish-Venezuelan national

4. Investor wrongdoing

Greece-Romania BIT, Art. 9: "Disputes between an investor of a Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the latter under this Agreement, in relation to an investment of the former, shall, if possible, be settled by the disputing parties in an amicable way..."

Roussalis v. Romania: Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to entertain counterclaims by host State for investor wrongdoing

Part III

Flexibility

- I. Independence and impartiality
- 2. Forum shopping
- 3. Investor wrongdoing

I. Independence and impartiality

Recasting standard:

- I. Blue Bank v. Venezuela (2013)
- 2. Abaclat v. Argentina (2014)
- 3. Caratube v. Kazakhstan (2014)

But...

 RSM v. St. Lucia (2014): Arbitrators appear not to fully accept new standard and reject challenge

2. Forum shopping

- Romak v. Uzbekistan: simple cross-border sale contract does not meet <u>inherent definition</u> of investment
- 2. Philip Morris Asia Ltd (Hong Kong) v. Australia: dismissed case on grounds of "abuse of process" due to last-minute restructuring
- 3. Guaracachi (US) & Rurelec (UK) v. Bolivia:
 Tribunal dismissed first Claimant's claim under denial of benefits clause

3. Investor wrongdoing/windfall

- Yukos v. Russia: accepts claim for contributory fault
- 2. Chevron v. Ecuador I: accepts quasi-tax set off on the basis of "but for" causation


Part IV

Convergence

- I. Independence and impartiality
- 2. Forum shopping
- 3. Investor wrongdoing

Perceived shortcoming	CETA	TTIP (EU informal proposal)	ТРР
Lack of independence and impartiality of arbitrators	Compliance with International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration Supplemental rules adopted by the Committee on Service and Investment Mandatory Code of Conduct	Permanent judges Appointed jointly by EU and US Judges assigned randomly to each case High technical and legal qualification Prohibited from working as counsel in investment cases Mandatory Code of Conduct	Code of conduct Other relevant rules and guidelines on conflicts of interest in international arbitration on which the Contracting Parties may agree
	(Investment Chapter, Art. X.25.6 and X.42(2)(b), Annexed Rules of Procedure and Code of Conduct, consolidated CETA text)	(Section 3, Art. 9 and 10, 11(1) + Annex II (Code of Conduct), EU proposal)	(Art. 9.21.6,TPP text released)

Perceived shortcoming	СЕТА	TTIP (EU informal proposal)	ТРР
Frivolous or abusive claims	Cooling-off period of 180 days 3 years statute of limitations to bring a claim (or 2 years after end of proceedings before national tribunal) Expedited review of manifestly unfounded claims Loser pays principle Manipulative and fraudulent claims are excluded	Cooling-off period of 6 months 3 years statute of limitations to bring a claim (or 2 years after end of proceedings before national tribunal) Expedited review of manifestly unfounded claims Loser pays principle No jurisdiction when claimant acquired ownership/control of investment for purpose of bringing claim	Cooling-off period of 6 months 3 ½ years statute of limitations to bring a claim Expedited review of manifestly unfounded claims Possible award of attorneys' fees Denial of benefits clause to "shell companies" Express provision for States' counterclaims
	(Investment Chapter, Arts. X.17, X.18, X.21, X.29, X.30, X.36, para. 5, CETA text)	(Section 3, Arts. 4.5, 6, 15, 16, 17 and 28(4), EU proposal)	(Arts. 9.17, 9.18, 9.20.1, 9.22.4, 9.22.5, 9.22.6, TPP text released)



Thank you!



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